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ROACH v. COMMONWEALTH
1996 WL 88107 (Va. 1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On December3, 1993, Mary Ann Hughes was shot and killed in her
home. The cause of death was a single shotgun wound to the chest.1 Three
days later Steve Edward Roach, Hughes's next-door-neighbor, con-
fessed to the killing.2 Roach, who was 17 years old at the time, was tried
as an adult and convicted of capital murder of Mary Ann Hughes in the
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. At the
penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the court struck the evidence as
to the "vileness" predicate of a capital sentence, but submitted the case
to the jury upon the "future dangerousness" predicate. The jury deter-
I Roach v. Commonwealth, No. 951416, 1996 WL 88107, *1 (Va.
Mar. 1, 1996).
2 Id. at *3.
3 Roach was also tried on indictments charging him with the use of
a firearm in the commission of murder, and robbery by violence to the
person of Mary Ann Hughes. Id. at *1.
4 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1995).
5 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *16.
6 The court rejected some of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusive language. Defense counsel is nevertheless to be
commended for preserving these numerous issues for later habeas
review, particularly federal habeas review. The court's rulings provide
little if any guidance because they apply broad, settled principles of law
to facts that are specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in this
category that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1) the denial
of an instruction informing the jury of Roach's 25-year period of parole
ineligibility; (2) the refusal to limit evidence ofjuvenile and unadjudicated
conduct at sentencing; (3) the failure of Virginia's transfer statute to
provide for individualized consideration ofajuvenile's moral culpability
and maturity; (4) that the sentencing verdict form renders the jury's
option of imposing a life sentence unconstitutionally vague and obscures
mitigation evidence; (5) the failure of Virginia's death penalty statutes to
give meaningful guidance to jurors that they may impose a death
sentence only if they determine beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravat-
ing circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances; (6) that Virginia's
death penalty statutes violate defendants' rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by allowing
the jury to find "future dangerousness" based upon unadjudicated
crimes; (7) That Virginia's capital murder and death penalty statutes as
administered are unconstitutional for every reason cited in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); and (8) the failure of Virginia's death
penalty statutes to provide defendants meaningful appellate review and
the denial of equal protection and due process because of the single tier
of appellate review of death sentences. Id. at *6. Other issues that were
preserved but that will not be discussed in this summary include: (I) that
the statutes defining the authority ofjuvenile intake officers violates the
separation of powers clauses of the Virginia Constitution because intake
officers are employees of the Department of Youth and Family Services,
an executive agency, and are constitutionally prohibited from exercising
the judicial powers of determining probable cause, issuing petitions or
criminal warrants, or issuing detention orders; Id. at *6-7. (2) that the
circuit court only acquired jurisdiction to try Roach only for the lesser
included offense of first degree murder because thejuvenile court did not
render a probable cause determination concerning the presence of
mined that the "future dangerousness" predicate was satisfied and
sentenced Roach to death.
3
HOLDING
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld Roach's
conviction and death sentence. Afterconducting the statutorily mandated
review of the death sentence,4 the court likewise declined to set aside the
sentence.5 The court held, inter alia,6 that the trial court had not erred by
refusing to grant several portions of Roach's motion for a bill of
particulars, 7 nor had the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the
aggravating circumstances supporting imposition of the death penalty;
Id. at *8. (3) the motion for a change of venue on the basis that the crime,
a "high profile" murder in a rural setting, rendered the trial court unable
to empanel an impartial jury, as evidenced by widespread pretrial
publicity that was prejudicial and the facts that greater than 50 percent of
the jury pool was familiar with the defendant, the victim or her family,
the Commonwealth's Attorney or witnesses and that 31 jurors were
stricken for cause, including many who were stricken because of bias for
or against the accused or the prosecution; Id. at *9-10. (4) the refusal to
strike for cause juror Breeden who had been represented in a legal matter
by the Commonwealth's Attorney and who regarded the Commonwealth's
Attorney as his personal attorney; Id. at *10. (5) that the jury had
prematurely begun deliberations during the penalty phase of the trial; Id.
at * 11. and (6) the trial court's alleged error in finding that no good cause
had been shown to set aside the death sentence and impose a sentence of
life imprisonment. Id. at *15.
Finally, the issue of Roach's claim that his confession should have
been suppressed as being involuntary will not be discussed other than to
point out that the Supreme Court of Virginia arguably overstated its
obligation to deferto the trial judge's determination as to the voluntariness
of Roach's confession, in that such determinations are mixed questions
of law and fact and are not entitled to deference. Id. at *8-9. This issue
is analogous to Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995) (whether
defendant is in custody and therefore entitled to Miranda warning prior
to interrogation is mixed question of law and fact that must be indepen-
dently resolved without presumption of correctness by federal court on
habeas review).
The Supreme Court of Virginia also found that Roach had waived
his claims of error that (a) Virginia's juvenile transfer statute is uncon-
stitutional as applied, (b) the trial court erred in overruling Roach's
motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty and to strike the
capital murder charge on the grounds that the post-sentence report
infringed upon his rightto due process, to confronthis accusers, to befree
from cruel and unusual punishment, and to effective assistance of
counsel, and (c) Virginia's death penalty statute, as administered, denies
capital defendants effective assistance of counsel. Roach, at *5, n.3. It
is important to note how easily claims of error can be deemed defaulted.
Virginia's stringent default and waiver rules require that all claims be
properly raised at trial, assigned as error, and argued in brief. Va. Sup.
Ct. R. 5:17(c)(4) (1995). For a thorough treatment of Virginia's default
and waiver doctrine see Groot, To Attain The Ends OfJnstice: Confront-
ing Virginia's Default Rules In Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 44 (1994).
7 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *8.
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verdict of capital murder based on the alleged absence of evidence
corroborating Roach's confession that he was the "triggerman." 8 The
court also held that the trial court had not erred in refusing to instruct the
jury on the meaning of the word "probability" as used in the "future
dangerousness" aggravator, 9 and that the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury that Roach, if sentenced to life in prison, would be ineligible for
parole for 25 years had not violated Roach's Fourteenth Amendment
right of equal protection.10 The Supreme Court of Virginia also held that
the trial court was not required to articulate a standard of proof for
determining "future dangerousness,"tI and that the proof of Roach's
"future dangerousness" was sufficient. 12 Finally, the court held that
Roach's death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice orotherarbitrary factors, norwas it excessive or disproportion-
ate. 13
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Finding of "Future Dangerousness"
A. Evidence Considered; Sufficiency
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the jury had suffi-
cient evidence from which to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there
was a probability that Roach would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. In reaching this
conclusion the court emphasized that the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the capital murder alone may be sufficient to support a finding
of "future dangerousness."' 14 The court reasoned that since Roach shot
at point-blank range a defenseless, 70-year-old neighbor who had always
been kind to him, then walked past herbody, robbed herof hermoney and
car keys, and left her lying on the floor simply because he wanted her
money, the jury could conclude that Roach placed little value on human
life and was willing to kill even a defenseless friend in order not to be
identified as the perpetrator of a robbery. However, the facts that the court
seized upon to support the finding of future dangerousness were facts and
evidence that are more appropriately considered as to "vileness." The
"vileness" predicate was stricken as a matter of law by the trial judge and
was not even put to the jury, ostensibly because there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of "vileness." 15 Yet the court simply
converted this evidence into a showing of "future dangerousness." Given
that this evidence was insufficient for a finding of "vileness" to which it
was more appropriately directed, one might expect the same evidence to
be insufficient to support a finding of the "future dangerousness"
predicate. Furthermore, "future dangerousness" as upheld by the court
neithernarrows the class of murderers eligible for a sentence of death, nor
provides guidance to jury discretion. The court determined that the jury,
using the "vileness" evidence, could have reasonably concluded that
Roach placed little value on human life and thus found beyond a
reasonable doubt the probability that Roach posed a continuing serious
threat to society. But what murderer does value human life? Ajuror could
reasonably conclude that any murderer placed little value on human life
and thus find "future dangerousness."
The Supreme Court of Virginia also pointed to Roach's "escalating
pattern of criminal behavior." The court highlighted the seven-month
8 Id. at *11.
9 Id. at *12.
10 Id. at *12-13.
11 Id. at *13.
12 Id. at *13-14.
13 Id. at* 15-16.
14 Id. at *14 (citing Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145,
431 S.E.2d 48, 53, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 336 (1993)).
15 Id. at *1.
period before the murder during which time Roach committed a bur-
glary, two automobile larcenies and violated a condition of his probation.
The court found that "given Roach's escalating pattern of criminal
behavior culminating in the murder of Mrs. Hughes, the jury had
sufficient evidence" to support a finding of "future dangerousness." This
reasoning is also problematic, however, because under the court's
rationale, all capital murderers with petty criminal histories have an
escalating pattern of criminal behavior. The court also interpreted
Roach's previous criminal behavior as indicating a broad potential for
violence. The court stated that although none of these incidents involved
any actual or threatened violence, all four acts involved the potential for
violence. The court went so far as to state that it was only "fortuitous
circumstance" that Roach's burglary did not involve violence. 16 If the
potential for violence is inherent in crimes such as burglary, auto theft,
or carrying a weapon in violation of probation, and such a criminal
history is sufficient to support a finding of "future dangerousness" even
in the face of expert testimony that the defendant's record showed no
pattern towards violence, 17 then a jury could find that any capital
defendant who had been previously convicted of such a crime should be
sentenced to death based on the threat posed to society. The court
emphasized that burglary involves inherent dangers to personal safety,
the danger that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to
perpetrate the intended crime or to escape and the danger that the
occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby
inviting more violence. 18 But such potentially violent criminal conduct
ought not be sufficient to support a finding of "future dangerousness"
because many crimes involve similar inherent potential for violence and
a juror could find that any capital defendant with a prior record of non-
violent crimes as relatively minor as breaking and entering or even
trespassing poses a future danger and thereby warrants a sentence of
death. Thus, neither the court's consideration of the offense itself, nor the
court's interpretation of Roach's past behavior narrowed the field of
those capital defendants who are eligible for a sentence of death, or
provided guidance to the jurors in choosing whether to impose a death
sentence or life imprisonment.
The court used this history of potentially violent criminal conduct
to further support the finding of "future dangerousness" despite the
testimony of Dr. Gary Lee Hawk, a forensic psychologist appointed by
the court. Dr. Hawk testified that there was no pattern of violent behavior
in Roach's life. The court dismissed Dr. Hawk's testimony because "the
jury was entitled to weigh this opinion in conjunction with all the
evidence of Roach's criminal behavior[.]" 19 But, in emphasizing the
jury's ability to weigh contradictory evidence, the court downplayed the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding.
B. Scope and Reach of "Future Dangerousness"; Appellate
Court's Duty to Confine
Central to the issue of sufficiency of the jury's finding of "future
dangerousness," is the question: "sufficient to establish what?" Roach
claimed that, because the Supreme Court of Virginia has never reversed
a death sentence based on insufficiency of evidence of "future danger-
ousness," Virginia case law articulates no standards to confine the reach
16 Id. at *14, n.8. The court opined that the fact the premises were
unoccupied did not change its analysis but made no findings about
Roach's knowledge or lack thereof regarding occupancy or his intent
towards any possible occupants. Id.
17 Roach presented such testimony. Id. at *5.
18 Id. at * 14 (citing Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121,140,410
S.E.2d at 254, 266 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992)).
19 Id. at *15.
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of the "future dangerousness" factor and that such standards must be
employed. 20 The court rejected this claim. The court based its rejection
on the conclusion that the requirement of individualized consideration of
the defendant and the crime renders unnecessary the pronouncement of
precise requirements for a finding of "future dangerousness." While the
court admitted that the standards are imprecise it pointed out that
defendants are protected from an unsupported finding of "future danger-
ousness" by appellate review of the sufficiency of the jury's finding.
2 1
However, as Roach pointed out, the Supreme Court of Virginia has never
reversed a death sentence based on insufficiency of evidence of "future
dangerousness." The less than serious review in the instant case is a
perfect example. The standard for finding "future dangerousness" is
admittedly imprecise, yet the court, reviewing such findings, has never
reversed a death sentence due to insufficiency of the evidence of "future
dangerousness." Therefore, it is likely that there is, in reality, no vigorous
review conducted of the sufficiency of the finding of "future dangerous-
ness" and its reach is potentially limitless.
C. Vagueness in the Aggravating Factor
An instruction to the jury defining "probability" as it relates to the
finding of "future dangerousness" might have alleviated at least some of
the deficiencies in the application of the factor. Roach asked for, and was
denied, such an instruction. Roach claimed that the trial court erred by
refusing to give his proffered instruction. The Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the denial. The court cited Mickens v. Commonwealth22 for the
proposition that "probability" as it appears in the "future dangerousness"
predicate is not ambiguous. 23 However, the Mickens court, in finding
that the term "probability" was not unconstitutionally vague, cited
Virginia case law defining "probability," as used in the "future danger-
ousness" factor, as: "'a likelihood substantially greater than a mere
possibility' that an accused would commit violent acts in the fu-
ture. .... 24 This definition of "probability" is precisely the jury
instruction thatRoach requested. The Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling
that Roach was not entitled to such an instruction appears to contradict
the spirit if not the letter of the statutory mandate that "[a] proposed jury
instruction . . . which constitutes an accurate statement of the law
applicable to the case, shall not be withheld from the jury solely for its
nonconformance with the model jury instructions." 25
Furthermore, in Mickens and in Smith v. Commonwealth,2 6 the
court did not hold that the term "probability" as used in the "future
dangerousness" predicate was unambiguous in all cases; rather, the court
simply determined that the term "probability" was not vague when the
defendant's criminal history sufficiently predicted "future dangerous-
20 Id. at *13. If the "future dangerousness" factor is not confined
by the Supreme Court of Virginia to a scope that would not include all
capital murderers, then it is constitutionally infirm for the same reasons
the application of the "vileness" factor was invalidated in Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
21 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *13.
22 247 Va. 395,442 S.E.2d 678, vacated on other grounds, 115 S.
Ct. 307 (1994).
23 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *12 (citing Mickens, 247 Va. at 403,
442 S.E.2d at 684).
24 Mickens, 247 Va. at 403, 442 S.E.2d at 684 (quoting Smith v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 967 (1979)).
25 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-263.2 (1995).
26 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979).
ness." The Smith court explained, "[Where] the [capital] defendant has
been previously convicted of 'criminal acts of violence,' i.e., serious
crimes against [a] person committed by intentional acts of unprovoked
violence, there is a reasonable 'probability' ... that he would commit
similar crimes in the future."27 However, Roach had not previously
committed such acts of violence, and in a case such as Roach, "probabil-
ity," without the Mickens definition, is even more vague and ambiguous.
II. Proportionality Review
Under the authority of Virginia Code section 17.1-110.1.E, defense
counsel had assembled an appendix to the appellant's brief, compiling
seventy-two Virginia capital cases, fifty-eight of which resulted in a
sentence of life imprisonment. The appendix compared the facts of these
cases toRoach's circumstances in supportoftheclaim thatRoach's death
sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant.
In conducting proportionality review the court claimed to have
considered "whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction gener-
ally impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes,
considering both the crime and the defendant." 28 The court then chose to
ignore the bulk of appellant's appendix and compared Roach's sentence
to the sentence imposed in Chichester v. Commonwealth,29 Chandler v.
Commonwealth,30 and Joseph v. Commonwealth.3 1 The evidence in all
three of these cases appears to be more aggravated and less mitigated than
in Roach. In Chichester, the defendant and an accomplice extensively
prepared for, and carried out, the armed robbery of a pizza restaurant and
the defendant shot and killed an employee at the restaurant. The defen-
danthad previously committed armed robbery at anotherpizza restaurant
during which he attempted to shoot an employee in the head.32 Further-
more, it appears that at the penalty phase, the defendant in Chichester
presented little, if any, evidence in mitigation.33 In Chandler, the
defendant and four accomplices conspired to commit armed robbery of
a convenience store. The defendant also shot a store employee in the face,
saying "boom, boom" as he did so.34 The defendant subsequently
threatened to kill anyone who hurt him orreported him to the police, and
specified that he would "do it slowly so they would suffer."
35 The
defendant had previously committed assault and battery, armed robbery,
and several other offenses. While serving an earlier term in prison, the
defendant had also assaulted another inmate. 36 Furthermore, the defen-
dant presented "little or no evidence of a mitigating nature." 37 In Joseph,
the defendant and an accomplice committed armed robbery of a sand-
wich shop and the defendant killed a store employee by shooting the
employee in the back while the employee lay face down on the floor.
38
27 Smith, 219 Va. at 477-78, 248 S.E.2d at 148-49 (emphasis
added).
28 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *15 (quoting Jenkins v. Common-
wealth, 244 Va. 445,461,423 S.E.2d 360,371 (1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 1036 (1993)).
29 248 Va. 311,448 S.E.2d 638 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1134
(1995).
30 249 Va. 270,455 S.E.2d 219, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 233 (1995).
31 249 Va. 78,452 S.E.2d 862, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 204 (1995).
32 Chichester, 248 Va. at 314-17, 448 S.E.2d at 642-43.
33 Id. at 318-19, 448 S.E.2d at 644.
34 Chandler, 249 Va. at 274, 455 S.E.2d at 221-22.
35 Id. at 282,455 S.E.2d at 226-27.
36 Id. at 282, 455 S.E.2d at 226.
37 Id. at 283, 455 S.E.2d at 227.
38 Joseph, 249 Va. at 81-82, 452 S.E.2d at 865.
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Twice before, Joseph had committed armed robbery of a convenience
store and abducted convenience store employees. Joseph had also been
convicted for assaulting a police officer.39 Although Joseph presented
evidence in mitigation of death, this evidence does not appear to have
been as extensive as the mitigation evidence introduced by Roach.
40
Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court of Virginia, in conducting its
proportionality review, ignored substantial variances in the level of
aggravating circumstances and failed to consider evidence in mitigation.
None of the defendants in the cases the court cited offered the extensive
evidence in mitigation that Roach had, but all three faced much greater
aggravating evidence. Furthermore, none of the defendants were minors
at the time they committed their capital murders.
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia's statutory obligation to
review death sentences is independent of any input by appellants,
defense counsel are urged to include their own proportionality review
comparisons in an appendix to appellant's brief. These comparisons then
become part of the record for review, not only by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, but by federal courts reviewing the claim that Virginia does not
provide constitutionally required meaningful appellate review.
4 1
m. Denial of the Motion for Bill of Particulars
Roach filed a motion for a bill of particulars requesting the court to
direct the Commonwealth to identify all of the grounds on which it
contended the defendant was guilty of capital murder, any and all
evidence on which it intended to rely for a conviction upon the charge of
capital murder, the aggravating factors upon which it intended to rely in
seeking the death penalty, the specific components of "vileness" on
which it intended to offer evidence, every narrowing construction of the
"vileness" factoron which it intended to offerevidence, any unadjudicated
allegations of misconduct by the defendant upon which it intended to
offer evidence, any circumstances of the offense it contended were
relevant to proof of the "future dangerousness" factor, and any and all
evidence on which it intended to rely in support of the aggravating factors
identified or in support of its contention that death is the appropriate
punishment for the defendant. The trial court granted the portion of the
motion that called for the Commonwealth to identify unadjudicated
conduct and circumstances of the offense which are relevant to the
"future dangerousness" factor. The trial court denied the remainder of the
motion, however. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that a defendant
is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a matter of right and that the trial
court has discretion in determining whether to require the Common-
wealth to file a bill of particulars.42 The court held that because the
indictment gave the defendant sufficient notice of the nature and charac-
ter of the offense charged such that he could make his defense, the bill of
particulars was not required and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the balance of Roach's motion.43 The indictment upon which
Roach was tried gave no notice other than that Roach was alleged to have
committed "capital murder by the willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of Mary Ann Hughes in the commission of robbery while armed
39 Id. at 88, 452 S.E.2d at 869.
40 Id. at 87-88, 452 S.E.2d at 868.
41 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (reiterating holding of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that some meaningful appel-
late review is required of a capital conviction and sentence).
42 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *8 (citing Quesinberry v. Common-
wealth,241 Va. 364,372,402S.E.2d218,223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834
(1991)).
43 Id. (citing Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225
S.E.2d 411,413 (1976)).
44 Id. at *8, n.6.
with a deadly weapon[.]" 44 Obviously, the indictment differed from the
requested bill of particulars in that it gave no notice of the aggravating
factors or of any evidence intended to support the aggravating factors, or,
generally, to support the contention that death was the appropriate
punishment for Roach. Yet such notice would seem to be essential to a
defendant's ability to make his defense. For example, Roach had no
notice that the aggravating circumstances which would support his death
sentence included the potential for violence inherent in his otherwise
nonviolent prior misconduct, the alleged pattern of escalation in potential
violence in Roach's misconduct, the allegation that he killed Hughes to
avoid being identified and the facts surrounding the killing itself. In
making his case against death, Roach cannot reasonably have known the
importance of challenging such things. Although the Supreme Court of
Virginia continues to reject the claim that capital defendants are entitled
to discover the Commonwealth's case in order to defend against the
state's case for death, defense counsel are urged to continue to include the
claim. It may one day bear fruit.45
IV. Simmons Issue
During the penalty phase of the trial, after the jury had been
instructed but before it began deliberating, one juror asked the trial court,
"Does life in prison mean with no chance of parole or truly life in prison,
or is he eligible for parole?" The trial court gave the jury an additional
instruction stating, "Having found the defendant guilty, you should
impose such punishment as you feel is just under the evidence and within
the instructions of the Court. You are not to concern yourself with what
may happen afterwards."'46 Roach argued, unsuccessfully, that the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Simmons v. South Carolina47
required the trial court to instruct the jury as to Roach's period of parole
ineligibility and preserved this issue for appeal. The Supreme Court of
Virginia adopted the narrowest reading of Simmons when it determined
that capital defendants are entitled to instruct the jury as to their parole
ineligibility only when "future dangerousness" is in issue and only when
they are ineligible for parole for life.
48
In addition, Roach argued that refusal to inform the jury that if
sentenced to life in prison he would not be eligible for parole consider-
ation for 25 years constituted a denial of his Fourteenth Amendment right
to equal protection under the law. Roach's equal protection claim was
that capital defendants with more aggravated prior records are more
likely to be ineligible for parole and are thus entitled to ajury instruction
on this parole ineligibility. These capital defendants are more likely to be
spared a sentence of death by a jury assured of their ineligibility for
parole. At the same time, capital defendants who have virtually clean or
less aggravated prior records are not entitled to a similar instruction
informing the jury of the period of their parole ineligibility and are thus
less likely to be spared a death sentence. This disparate treatment leads
to unlawful discrimination between similarly situated capital defen-
dants. The court determined that Roach's right to equal protection was
not violated because classifications based on parole eligibility are not
45 The issue is essentially the same as that in Simmons v. South
Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), which was rejected by the Supreme
Court of Virginia for years before it was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court. See Pohl and Turner, IfAt First You Don't Succeed: The
Real And Potential Impact Of Simmons v. South Carolina In Virginia,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994).
46 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *12.
47 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
48 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at * 13 (citing Wright v. Commonwealth,
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"suspect" and such a classification need only "rationally advance[] a
reasonable and identifiable governmental objective[,]" 49 which the
court found in the objective of eliminating improper speculation by the
jury. The court justified the anomalous result by claiming that lifetime
parole ineligibility is relevant to the issue of the defendant's "future
dangerousness" but parole ineligibility for a period of 25 or more years
is not probative of this issue. This rationale is flawed, however, in that it
fails to take into account the drop-off in recidivism after 25 years in
prison and 25 years of aging and maturity. Although parole ineligibility
for a period of years may not have the weight of evidence of parole
ineligibility for life, it is relevant to that issue.
50
It is likely that "rational basis" is the correct equal protection
standard to be applied since capital defendants ineligible for parole for
a period of years are not a"suspect" class. However, to conclude that the
rational justification for not requiring suchjury instructions is thatparole
ineligibility for a period of years is not probative, either as mitigation or
to rebut "future dangerousness," directly contradicts the United States
Supreme Court's rationale in Simmons. Furthermore, as Roach con-
tended, this distinction appears to be unreasonable in that it leads to
anomalous results. It is difficult to see any impropriety in the jury's
248 Va. 485, 487, 450 S.E.2d 361, 362 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1800 (1995)).
49 Id. at* 13 (quotingSchweikerv. Wilson,450 U.S. 221,235 (1981)
and citing also Evans v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 481,323 S.E.2d
114, 122 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985)).
50 "In assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of the
defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant." Simmons, 114 S.
Ct. at 2194.
51 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *13.
consideration of the effect that a defendant's incarceration might have on
his "future dangerousness." Such a consideration is an essential part of
the jury's determination of the existence of the "future dangerousness"
aggravator. Thus it seems that the court's stated objective is unreason-
able and the classification fails even rational basis scrutiny. This ruling
appears even more unreasonable in the face of the jury's direct question-
ing as to the parole ineligibility of the defendant. By refusing to provide
the jury with the factually correct information, and only telling the jury
not to concern itself with whatmay happen after sentencing, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has, in its own words, done "nothing more than invite
the jury to speculate" 51 on the probability that the defendant will be
paroled from prison in a short period of time if the jury spares his life. In
Simmons, the United States Supreme Court specifically admonished
such a response by the trial court.
5 2
In the few pre-1995 cases that remain, defense counsel are urged to
preserve the post-Simmons issues, including the equal protection claim.
Summary and analysis by:
Douglas S. Collica
52 "The jury was left to speculate about [the defendant's] parole
eligibility when evaluating [his] future dangerousness, and was denied a
straight answer about [the defendant's] parole eligibility even when it
was requested." Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2195. "Far from ensuring that
the jury was not misled, however, [instructing the jury not to consider
parole] actually suggested that parole was available but that the jury, for
some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact." Id. at 2197.
FRY v. COMMONWEALTH
250 Va. 413, 463 S.E.2d 433 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On February 21, 1994, near the end of Exeter Mill Road in
Chesterfield County, Virginia, Tony Leslie Fry shot a car dealer, Leland
A. Jacobs, eleven times. He and his accomplice, Brad Hinson, had taken
a Ford Explorer out on a test drive with the intent to steal it and to murder
any salesperson who insisted on accompanying them. Fry stopped the
truck on Exeter Road, feigning a need to check the spare tire. AfterJacobs
had exited the truck, Fry told him to "look at that owl." When Jacobs
turned his head, Fry shot him in the back. Fry fired a total of eleven shots
into Jacobs' head, chest, and abdomen. 1
Coincidentally, Officer David L. Suda of the Chesterfield County
Police was looking for Fry on an arson charge when he confronted
Hinson and Fry in the Ford Explorer on Exeter Road shortly after the
killing. Hinson was driving. Suda approached the car and, upon noticing
blood on Fry's hand, asked Fry for an explanation. Fry said that he had
hurt himself "playing in the woods." Suda attempted to handcuff Fry, but
Fry resisted. He ceased resisting, but reached for the glove compartment
I Fty v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413, 415-16; 463 S.E.2d 433,
434-35.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 417-18; 463 S.E.2d at 435-36.
stating he wanted to kill himself. Suda sprayed Fry with mace. Hinson
immediately dove for the backseat of the truck and grabbed his coat, but
he released it when Officer Suda drew his gun. He then exclaimed his
innocence in the killing and led Suda to Jacobs' body. Fry confessed to
the killing and attested to Hinson's innocence.2 Once in police custody,
Fry was polite, respectful and candid about his part in the killing. He was
also very remorseful.
3
Fry was nineteen years old when he shot Jacobs. He had an IQ of 77
and a dependent personality disorder. His mother abandoned him and he
never knew his father's identity. He was raised by his maternal great-
grandmother, but grew up with few friends and was not involved in any
extra-curricular activities, except for singing in the church choir. His
schooling consisted of special education classes for the emotionally
disturbed. Prior to the shooting, Fry had not engaged in violent conduct.
4
Fry was indicted for capital murder for the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of Jacobs during the commission of robbery or
attempted robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.5 Fry pleaded
guilty at an arraignment on October 3, 1994. The court conducted a
4 Id. at 417-19; 463 S.E.2d at 435-36.
5 Id. at 414, 463 S.E.2d at 434 (citing Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31(4)
(Supp. 1994)).
